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Romeo and Juliet Online and in Trouble:
Criminalizing Depictions of Teen Sexuality
(c u l8r: g2g 2 jail)
By Dawn C. Nunziato*
[T]eenagers engaging in sexual activity . . . is a fact of modern society and has
been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages.1

I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Consider the tales of Alice and Bob, and Carol and Dave, two sets of young lovers.
Alice and Bob decide one night, in the midst of their lovemaking, to memorialize the
event and take some racy—but not obscene—pictures with Bob’s cell phone. Across
town, Carol and Dave have the same idea, and Dave takes similar pictures with his cell
phone. Bob and Dave decide to share these images with their lovers via text messaging
using their cell phones or by uploading them onto their personal computers. Perhaps Bob
and Dave take the further step of sharing these images with others.
Fast-forward six months. As a result of his actions, Bob is facing the possibility of
life in prison, while Dave’s actions are not even plausibly criminal. Wherein lies the
difference? Bob and his lover are seventeen years old, while Dave and his lover are
eighteen. Because Bob’s lover is under the age of majority, Bob is subject to far more
severe punishment than is Dave. This anomalous result contravenes our general
expectations of our legal system, which imposes gentler punishments on minors than on
adults.2
Enter the world of “sexting,” where prosecutors throughout the United States have
invoked child pornography laws to impose harsh penalties on those involved with
creating, possessing, or distributing sexually themed images of minors, as Part II
discusses. Because the subject of Bob’s photographs is seventeen years old, under
federal and state child pornography laws Bob can be criminally charged with creating,
possessing, and distributing child pornography.3 In several instances throughout the
country, prosecutors have wielded their power to go after minors like Bob who, with the
*

Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. The author is grateful to Dean
Frederick Lawrence for his generous financial support. The author is also thankful for the helpful
comments of Jonathan Lowy, for the excellent editorial assistance of Pat Balakrishnan, and for the superb
research assistance of Robert Arcamona, Thomas Hayne, Bridget Rochester, Megan Zaidan, and Kenneth
Rodriguez.
1
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).
2
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00–70.10 (McKinney 2009) (setting lower minimum and maximum
prison terms for juveniles); IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(1)(a), (3) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing for a
juvenile’s simple misdemeanor sentence to consist of community service or a fine up to $100, while an
adult must pay $50 to $100 or serve up to thirty days in prison).
3
See infra Part III.
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help of new technologies such as cell phones, webcams, e-mail, and social networking
sites, create and exchange sexually themed images of themselves and their intimate
acquaintances.
Bob’s conduct—taking and sharing a photograph of a seventeen-year-old girl in a
state of undress or engaged in a sexual act—technically falls within most state and federal
child pornography laws. However, those laws were created to punish and deter a far
different class of conduct—adults’ creation and dissemination of images that depict
sexual abuse of child victims. The creation and dissemination of true child pornography
is a universally condemned act that is appropriately subject to some of the harshest
penalties under the law. This Article contends that Bob’s conduct, however, is not true
child pornography, and the law should not treat it as such. Federal and state child
pornography laws should be revised to expressly exempt Bob’s conduct from their reach.
Although it may be proper to hold Bob liable for violating Alice’s privacy if he shares
such images without Alice’s consent, he should not be subject to the same penalties as a
true child pornographer. Moreover, Bob and Alice enjoy a First Amendment right to
create and share depictions of themselves engaged in sexual activity to which they legally
consent.
Part II of this Article analyzes some recent instances in which minors were
threatened with and subject to child pornography charges for sexting. Part III examines
the law of child pornography and the stringent constitutional requirements imposed by
the Supreme Court upon legislative efforts to proscribe sexually themed content
involving minors. Part IV then explores the constitutional rights enjoyed by minors
generally and minors’ right to engage in sexually themed expression specifically. Part V
proposes revisions to state child pornography laws to exempt sexting from their reach.
Finally, Part VI contends that while sexting should not be criminally punishable as child
pornography, it should be actionable as an invasion of the subject’s privacy if the subject
did not consent. Further, social networking sites should not be immune from liability for
facilitating such invasions of privacy.
II. THE BACK STORY: RECENT SEXTING PROSECUTIONS

¶6

¶7

Over the past several years, as cell phones with built-in digital cameras and social
networking sites facilitating the posting of digital images have become increasingly
popular, teenagers (among others) have begun using these technologies with greater
frequency. Many of these teens, who have just begun exploring their sexuality, use these
technologies to engage in what has become known as “sexting”—the taking and sharing
of sexually themed images of themselves or others via their cell phones or using web
cams in conjunction with popular social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook.
Teens habitually use these technologies to connect with their peers in general by talking,
texting, and creating and sharing images, video, and audio. They have also increasingly
used cell phones and social networking sites to explore their sexuality by exchanging
sexually themed communications of all types. This confluence of sexual coming of age
and ever-advancing technologies has changed the means teenagers use to express
themselves, but the underlying messages they express are largely the same as those of
prior generations and as old as Shakespeare’s tale of star-crossed young lovers.
One such means of exploration and communication is sexting. A 2008 survey
found that approximately twenty percent of all teenagers have sent or posted nude or
58
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semi-nude pictures of themselves, including twenty-two percent of teen girls, eighteen
percent of teen boys, and eleven percent of younger teen girls between the ages of
thirteen and sixteen.4 A survey released in December 2009 by the Pew Research Center’s
Internet and American Life Project (Pew Report) made similar findings, including that
fifteen percent of cell phone-owning teenagers ages twelve to seventeen have received a
sexually suggestive nude or semi-nude image or video of someone they know via text
message.5 The Pew Report also examined the social contexts in which teenagers engage
in such communications and found that sexting occurs most often in the following
contexts: exchanges of images solely between two romantic partners; exchanges between
partners that are then shared outside the relationship; and exchanges between people who
are not yet in a relationship, but where one person hopes to enter into such a relationship.6
According to the Pew Report:
[S]exually suggestive images have become a form of relationship currency. . . .
These images are shared as a part of or instead of sexual activity, or as a way of
starting or maintaining a relationship with a significant other. And they are also
passed along to friends for their entertainment value, as a joke or for fun.7

¶8

As challenging as it may be for many concerned parents, teenagers’ use of such
technology for general purposes has become an integral part of their creativity, selfactualization, and socialization in today’s inter-networked society. But the ability to
capture images and video by simply pressing a button on a palm-sized device that is
always at hand can create serious problems for both the would-be subject and the
photographer or videographer. This is especially true when the images captured are of an
embarrassing or intimate nature. The ability to instantaneously capture and share images
with others, via cell phones or the Internet, presents a host of new problems. The
question becomes how to respond reasonably, effectively, and compassionately to the
problems that teenagers’ use and misuse of new technologies raise. This Article contends
that the response of throwing the book at teenagers—in particular, the draconian book of

4

NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A
SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf. The study makes clear,
however, that the survey respondents do not constitute a probability sample, as the respondents were
selected from those who volunteered to participate in the marketing company’s online surveys.
5
AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS AND SEXTING: HOW AND WHY MINOR TEENS ARE
SENDING SEXUALLY SUGGESTIVE NUDE OR NEARLY NUDE IMAGES VIA TEXT MESSAGING 5 (2009)
[hereinafter PEW REPORT], available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/teens-and-sexting.pdf.
6
Id. at 6–8.
7
Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Sexting, PEW INTERNET (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/Teens-and-Sexting.aspx (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also PEW REPORT, supra note 5. In other key findings, the Report found that there was no gender
difference in the sending of sexting images, that older teens are much more likely to send and receive these
images, that more intense cell phone users are more likely to receive sext images, and that eighteen percent
of teen cell phone owners with unlimited texting plans have received such images compared with eight
percent of teens on limited plans and three percent of teens who pay per message. See Anne Collier,
Sexting: New Study & the ‘Truth or Dare’ Scenario, CONNECT SAFELY (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.connectsafely.org/NetFamilyNews/sexting-new-study-a-the-truth-or-dare-scenario.html.
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child pornography laws—is unduly harsh, unreasonable, and indeed violates these
teenagers’ (and their parents’) First Amendment and privacy rights.
¶9
In several states, teenagers engaging in acts of sexting have been arrested for child
pornography and related crimes.8 In some cases, teenagers were threatened with
prosecution and faced severe, life-altering sanctions for engaging in such conduct.
Although such conduct should not be encouraged, it should not be the subject of child
pornography prosecution either. Consider the cases of three girls from Pennsylvania—
Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly, and (the pseudonymous) Nancy Doe. About three years
ago, when Marissa and Grace were twelve or thirteen, they attended a party where some
pictures were taken. Some of these pictures show Marissa and her longtime friend Grace
from the waist up.9 They are wearing opaque training bras and lying side by side, and
one of them is talking on the phone while the other is making a peace sign.10 In another
photograph, Nancy Doe is standing outside of a shower with a towel wrapped around her
body beneath her breasts.11 None of these photographs depict sexual activity of any kind,
and, while the picture of Nancy Doe depicted her partially nude, the pictures of Marissa
and Grace did not. In October 2008, some time after the pictures were taken, school
officials discovered these photographs on several students’ cell phones.12 The school
officials confiscated the students’ cell phones and turned them over to George
Skumanick, the District Attorney of Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, who initiated an
extensive and ill-conceived criminal investigation into this matter.13
¶10
In February 2009, District Attorney Skumanick wrote a letter to the parents of
Marissa, Grace, and Nancy, as well as to the parents of about twenty other students who
were depicted in those photos or found to have the photos on their cell phones.14 In his
letter, Skumanick threatened the students with child pornography charges unless those
involved agreed to the equivalent of a guilty plea.15 This included being placed on
probation and attending a re-education program devised to help the girls “gain an
understanding of how their actions were wrong” and “what it means to be a girl.”16 In his
letter, the District Attorney invited the parents to attend a meeting to discuss the details of
8

Some examples include Alabama, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Judith Levine, What’s the Matter with Teen Sexting?, AM.
PROSPECT (Jan. 30, 2009),
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=whats_the_matter_with_teen_sexting.
9
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’g Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634
(M.D. Pa. 2009).
10
Complaint at 9, Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (No. 3:09cv540).
11
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 144.
12
Id. at 143.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 143–44. Skumanick advised the girls and their parents that to avoid charges, they must “finalize
the paperwork for [an] informal adjustment,” Complaint, supra note,10 at 13 (internal quotation marks
omitted), which is the equivalent of “a guilty plea in the juvenile-delinquency context allowing for
probation before judgment.” Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6323 (West 2009)).
16
Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Shannon P. Duffy, ACLU Sues NE Pa. DA over Threats Leveled at Teens: Criminal Consequences of
‘Sexting’ at Issue in Federal Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 26, 2009, at 1; Press Release, Am. Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Sues Wyoming County D.A. for Threatening Teenage Girls with Child
Pornography Charges over Photos of Themselves (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/technology-andliberty/aclu-sues-wyoming-county-da-threatening-teenage-girls-child-pornography-charg.
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the program.17 Skumanick informed the parents that while participation in the reeducation program was “voluntary,” he would file charges against students who did not
participate in or successfully complete the program.18 He also informed a group of
parents and students that he had the authority to prosecute those involved in making
available pictures of girls photographed in their underwear, or even of girls photographed
wearing bikinis.19 The criminal statutes with which the students were charged carry
seven-year prison sentences, and juveniles convicted of these charges would have
permanent records, since the charges are felonies.20 Furthermore, if convicted of such
offenses, juveniles over fourteen years of age would be required under the state’s version
of Meghan’s Law to register as sex offenders for at least ten years and to have their
names and pictures displayed on the state’s sex-offender website.21 At the meeting,
Skumanick informed the parents that he was prepared to file felony charges against any
of their children who refused to agree to his deal within forty-eight hours.22
¶11
The vast majority of the parties chose to accept the district attorney’s deal.23 The
parents of Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly, and Nancy Doe instead opted to sue the district
attorney for, among other things, violating their children’s First Amendment rights.24
Specifically, the parents alleged that the district attorney violated their children’s rights
by retaliating against their children for exercising those rights.25 Were it not for the legal
challenge brought by the parents of Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly, and Nancy Doe, the
district attorney would have enjoyed unfettered discretion to threaten dozens of teenagers
with child pornography-related charges premised on acts of sexting.26
¶12
Consider further the case of A.H., a sixteen-year-old Florida teenager, and her
seventeen-year-old boyfriend J.G.W., who took digital photographs of themselves naked
and engaged in sexual activity.27 The couple uploaded these photographs to A.H.’s home
computer and e-mailed them to J.G.W., who could then access them on his home
computer.28 The couple did not further share these images with anyone else.29 As a
result, both A.H. and J.G.W. faced second-degree felony charges under Florida’s child
pornography laws, which prohibit individuals from “producing, directing or promoting a

17

Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 144.
Id.
19
Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 16.
20
Complaint, supra note 10 at 6–7.
21
Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791 (2009)).
22
Complaint, supra note 10, at 12.
23
Id. at 14 (“[E]very parent and minor, except the three families represented in this action, acceded to
Skumanick’s demands under threat of felony prosecution and accepted the informal adjustment.”).
24
Id. at 4.
25
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights “is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution [and is] actionable under [42
U.S.C. §] 1983.” Id. The Third Circuit decision is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 206–212.
26
However, while this case was on appeal, Skumanick was defeated by Jeff Mitchell in the November 2009
election, in the campaign for which Skumanick’s prosecutorial decision to pursue this case was an issue.
While it is impossible to say if this case was determinative, Skumanick had been in office since 1989 and
his defeat was somewhat of a surprise. See Robert L. Baker, Mitchell Upsets DA Skumanick, WYO.
COUNTY PRESS EXAMINER (Nov. 11, 2009), http://wcexaminer.com/index.php/archives/news/7550.
27
A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 239–40 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
18
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photograph or representation that they knew to include the sexual conduct of a child.”30
J.G.W. also faced one count of possession of child pornography.31
¶13
A.H. contested these charges, claiming that criminal prosecution under the state’s
child pornography statute violated her constitutional rights, including her right to
privacy.32 She maintained that the Florida Constitution protects her right to engage in
sexual activity with her boyfriend and that her right to privacy allows her to memorialize
these actions in digital images and to share these photographs with her boyfriend.33 A.H.
further claimed that the state’s action was unconstitutional on the ground that prosecuting
her for felony child pornography was not the least intrusive means of advancing any
compelling state interest in preventing such behavior.34 The court disagreed, holding that
the state has a compelling interest in protecting children from sexual “exploitation,”
regardless of whether the person charged is an adult or a minor (or the “child” herself).35
The court held that prosecution under the child pornography statute is the least intrusive
means of furthering the state’s interest and that A.H. did not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances to create or disseminate photographs of
her consensual sexual activities.36
¶14
Consider further the case of Phillip Alpert, a high school student who, at the age of
seventeen, had been involved in a two-year-long relationship with a sixteen-year-old
girl.37 One night, his girlfriend, with whom he shared many intimacies, e-mailed him a
nude picture of herself.38 The picture depicted neither a sexual act nor an obscene pose,
but rather simply showed her standing in front of the camera without clothes on.39
Unfortunately, Phillip’s relationship with his girlfriend did not last. After quarreling one
night, Phillip decided to exact revenge on his girlfriend.40 He used the password she had
previously shared with him to access her e-mail account.41 Phillip then retrieved the nude
picture his girlfriend had taken of herself (and had voluntarily sent to him) and sent it to
all of her e-mail contacts, totaling about seventy people.42
¶15
Sending his girlfriend’s nude picture to her e-mail contacts without her consent was
profoundly unwise. It undoubtedly greatly embarrassed his girlfriend and shocked and
surprised the recipients. His actions arguably violated her privacy rights and were
actionable as an invasion of her privacy, as this Article discusses below.43 While Phillip
30

Id. at 235 (majority opinion) (citing FLA. STAT. § 827.071(3) (2005)).
See id. at 235 n.1 (noting that he was charged under FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5)).
32
Id. at 236.
33
Id. (noting that A.H. relied on FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (1998)).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 235, 238.
37
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the Prosecution of a Teen
Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2009). The article includes a transcript of the
authors’ interview with Alpert and his attorney in question-and-answer format. Id. at 10–34.
38
Id. at 17.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 8.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See infra Part VI (arguing that incidents of sexting in which images are shared without the consent of the
subject are actionable under the public disclosure of private fact prong of the common law invasion of
privacy tort).
31
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may deserve some form of punishment, the punishment he received does not fit the
“crime.” After his former girlfriend’s parents contacted the authorities, Phillip was
arrested and threatened with prosecution for 140 counts of child pornography—one count
for each “possession” and another for each distribution of the image, applying each of the
two counts to the seventy individual recipients.44 Prosecutors told him he would spend
most of his life in prison if he did not accept a plea.45
¶16
Faced with the devastating possibility of life in prison, Phillip pled guilty to child
pornography charges.46 He was sentenced to five years probation and is required to
register as a sex offender wherever he resides until he turns forty-three years old (and
perhaps indefinitely).47 His name and face now appear on posters describing him as
guilty of child pornography.48 Because he was arrested for a felony, his college expelled
him and he has been unable to secure employment (prospective employers apparently do
not want to hire him because of his criminal record).49 Furthermore, Phillip can no
longer live with his father because his father’s home is too close to the high school Phillip
attended, and registered sex offenders cannot live in close proximity to such schools.50 In
short, Phillip’s life was devastated by the consequences of his unwise act and by the
state’s decision to charge him under child pornography laws.
¶17
Prosecutors throughout the nation have subjected teens who engaged in similar
conduct to the draconian regime of state child pornography laws. In April 2009, for
example, a fourteen-year-old New Jersey girl was arrested and charged with possession
and distribution of child pornography for posting thirty nude pictures of herself on
MySpace to share with her boyfriend.51 The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children found the photos and informed the local sheriff’s department.52 In March 2004,
a fifteen-year-old girl was arrested for taking nude photographs of herself engaged in
various sexual acts and posting them on the Internet.53 Prosecutors charged her with
sexual abuse of a child, possession of child pornography, and dissemination of child
pornography.54 In October 2008, a fifteen-year-old girl from Newark, Ohio was charged
with felony child pornography for texting nude images of herself to some of her

44

Richards & Calvert, supra note 37, at 9, 19.
Id. at 20.
46
Id.
47
Federal law requires states to comply with certain mandates regarding offender registration. The federal
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16962 (2006), requires states to
subject all juveniles over the age of fourteen convicted of applicable child pornography or sex offense
charges, id. § 16911(8), to register as a sex offender for at least fifteen years, id. § 16915(a), and to have
their names and pictures displayed on the state’s sex offender website, id. §§ 16914, 16918(a).
48
See Sexual Offender/Predator Flyer, FLA. DEPARTMENT L. ENFORCEMENT,
http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/flyer.do?personId=60516 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
49
Richards & Calvert, supra note 37, at 9.
50
Id. at 21.
51
See Beth DeFalco, NJ Girl, 14, Faces Child Porn Charges After Posting Nude Pics of Herself Online,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 27, 2009, available at Factivia, Doc. No. APRS000020090327e53r001av;
Charles Toutant, Legislation Would Decriminalize ‘Sexting’ by Teens, N.J. L.J., July 27, 2009, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432466455&slreturn=1.
52
DeFalco, supra note 51.
53
Teen Girl Charged with Posting Nude Photos on Internet, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 29, 2004, available
at Factivia, Doc. No. Document APRS000020040329e03t00ivc.
54
Id.
45
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classmates.55 If convicted, she may have to register as a sex offender for the rest of her
life.56 In Greensburg, Pennsylvania, three girls aged fourteen to fifteen texted nude
pictures of themselves to three male classmates aged sixteen to seventeen.57 School
officials seized one of the male students’ cell phones for using it in violation of the
school’s rules and discovered the photos.58 The girls were “charged with manufacturing,
disseminating or possessing child pornography while the boys face[d] charges of
possession” of child pornography.59 In Virginia, two teenage high school students were
charged in 2009 with child pornography and related charges after they solicited nude and
semi-nude pictures of younger female students to trade among themselves.60 The list
goes on.
¶18
In short, many teens in several states are engaging in sexting—as many as fifteen to
twenty percent of teens who have a cell phone, according to the latest studies.61
Prosecuting such conduct under criminal child pornography laws is misguided,
unconstitutional, and may harm the very people the laws were designed to protect.
III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
¶19

Currently enacted child pornography laws, at both the federal and state level,
generally do not exempt cases of sexting from their reach. However, an analysis of the
Supreme Court’s child pornography jurisprudence shows that applying such laws to
typical incidents of sexting is unconstitutional and inconsistent with the government’s
interests underlying such laws.
¶20
Generally, child pornography laws punish the possession, creation, distribution, and
receipt of visual depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Such laws
typically apply across the board to minors and do not exempt minors who are near the age
of majority or, indeed, over the legal age to consent to sexual relations.62 The term
“minor” in child pornography laws includes individuals up to age eighteen, although
some state laws specify a different age range. In recent years, laws addressing child
pornography have become increasingly harsh and expansive in their reach, especially at
the federal level.63 This Article reviews the contours of state and federal child
pornography laws and examines the Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, concluding
that applying these laws to instances of sexting does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

55

See Violet Blue, When Teens Make Their Own Porn, Who’s Being Exploited?, SFGATE.COM (Jan. 29,
2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-01-29/living/17331420_1_child-pornography-boys-face-chargesnude-photographs.
56
Id.
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
60
Bill Starks, Two Spotsylvania Students Arrested for Child Porn, in Latest ‘Sexting’ Case, WUSA9.COM
(Mar. 10, 2009, 5:35 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=82608&catid=188.
61
See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
62
See infra text accompanying notes 65–66.
63
Indeed, the federal Commission on Pornography (unsuccessfully) recommended increasing the age of
majority for child pornography laws from eighteen to twenty-one. See ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM’N ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 623–28 (1986).
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A. The Contours of Federal Child Pornography Laws
¶21

Congress undertook its first effort to outlaw child pornography with the passage of
the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.64 The current
version of the statute defines “child pornography” as “any visual depiction . . . of sexually
explicit conduct” by a minor65 and defines “minor” to include all those under eighteen
years of age.66 In response to the increased use of personal computers to access sexually
explicit content, Congress moved to expand the Act’s reach in 1988 and passed
amendments to the Act which included criminalizing the transmission of child
pornography “by any means including by computer.”67
¶22
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), provisions of which
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition struck down,68 revised and extended the behavior
prohibited by the Act.69 In addition to transporting, distributing, or receiving “any visual
depiction” that “involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,”70 the
CPPA made it a crime to possess computer disks containing three or more images of
child pornography.71 It also extended the federal prohibition of child pornography to
sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced without real
children, as well as material promoted or pandered so as to convey the impression that it
involves minors, regardless of whether it actually involves minors.72 In 1998, the
Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act modified the federal possession
requirement to prohibit possession of a computer disk that contains a single image of
child pornography (revising the three-image requirement in the CPPA).73 After portions
of the CPPA were struck down in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Congress went back
to the drawing board in an attempt to remedy the constitutional defects identified by the
Court and passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT Act).74 This Act redefined and narrowed the
pandering and solicitation provisions of the CPPA to punish only those who actually
believe, or intend others to believe, that the subjects of the sexually oriented material at
issue are real children.75 The Supreme Court upheld these provisions of the PROTECT
Act in United States v. Williams.76
64

Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260A (2006)).
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). “Sexually explicit conduct” is defined to include: “actual or simulated—(i) sexual
intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of
the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v)
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id. § 2256(2)(A).
66
Id. § 2256(1).
67
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511(b), 102 Stat.
4181, 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)).
68
535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
69
Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 300926.
70
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a), 2252A(a).
71
CPPA § 121(3)(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-28 to 3009-29 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)).
72
Id. § 121(2)(4), 101 Stat. at 3009-27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C)–(D) (2006)).
73
Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 203, 112 Stat. 2974,
2978 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(4)–(5), (d)).
74
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 501–513, 117 Stat. 650, 676–86 (2003).
75
See id. § 503(1), 117 Stat. at 680 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3), (a)(6)).
76
553 U.S. 285 (2008).
65
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¶23

Punishment of child pornography under federal law carries severe penalties,
including a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison for any first offense
involving trafficking.77 Additionally, those convicted of child pornography offenses are
typically required to register as sex offenders.78 Federal law provides for severe
maximum penalties as well, including a maximum punishment of twenty years for a first
offense and double that amount if the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction.79 The
federal government has aggressively prosecuted child pornography offenses under these
statutes. For example, over 1,500 defendants faced child pornography and related
charges in 2005.80 In 2007, the Justice Department launched Project Safe Childhood and
cracked down even more heavily on child pornography and related offenses.81
¶24
To the extent that these federal child pornography laws are applied to acts of actual
child pornography (typically involving possession, creation, or distribution of images of
young children by older male sexual predators, as well as involving or constituting sexual
abuse of children), these harsh penalties are appropriate. As the Supreme Court
recognized, “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to
the moral instincts of a decent people.”82 However, to the extent that such laws are
extended to incidents of teen sexting, the penalties are disproportionately harsh and
unconstitutional as applied. Federal child pornography laws provide no exception for
sexually explicit images voluntarily created and shared by older teenagers, despite the
fact that under federal law the teenagers may legally consent to engage in sexual
activity.83 Consequently, an individual can legally consent to engage in sexual activity,
but face severe criminal punishment for depicting such activity. Protecting sexual
activity while criminalizing the depiction and communication of depictions of that
activity leads to an anomalous result and presents First Amendment problems.
B. State Child Pornography Laws
¶25

The vast majority of states also have child pornography laws that regulate the
production, distribution, or possession of child pornography. Like Congress, many state
legislatures have amended their statutes to apply to computer, electronic, or digital
images.84 In fashioning their child pornography laws, the majority of states (thirty-two)
define a “child” as any person under the age of eighteen,85 notwithstanding the fact that
77

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911, 16913.
79
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b), 2252A(b).
80
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Project Safe Childhood
Initiative (Feb. 15, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/February/06_opa_081.html.
81
See, Jerry Markon, Crackdown on Child Pornography, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at A1.
82
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
83
See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (setting the age of consent in federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction at
sixteen).
84
See Karl A. Menninger, II, Cyberporn: Transmission of Images by Computer as Obscene, Harmful to
Minors or Child Pornography, 61 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 51, 87 (explaining that “state laws
prohibiting child pornography have phrases or terms clearly including computer-generated images”); see
also id. 87–88 nn.17–24 and accompanying text.
85
These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah,
78
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the vast majority of such states also fix the age of consent to legally engage in sexual
activity at sixteen.86 In contrast, three states define child under their child pornography
laws as anyone under the age of seventeen,87 three other states define child as anyone
under the age of sixteen,88 others provide variable definitions of minor,89 and the
remaining do not explicitly define the age of a minor or child.90 Yet, other states, while
defining minor broadly as anyone under eighteen, provide for enhanced punishment if the
minor involved is below a certain age.91 Some states provide for an affirmative defense if
the defendant is not much older than the minor involved,92 while other states enhance
penalties where the adult is significantly older than the minor involved.93 In contrast,
some states’ child pornography laws provide for varying penalties that depend on the age

Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY’S ASS’N, NAT’L CTR. FOR
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY DISTRIBUTION AND PROMOTION STATUTES (2010),
available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Child%20Pornography%20Distribution%20Statutes%203-2010.pdf
[hereinafter CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTES].
86
Thirty-four states set the age of consent—the minimum age at which an individual can legally consent to
engage in sexual intercourse under any circumstances—at sixteen years of age, while another six set the
age of consent at seventeen years of age. LEWIN GRP., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 5 (2004), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/report.pdf.
87
These states are Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTES, supra note 85, at
6, 10, 63.
88
These states are Connecticut, Montana, and Vermont. Id. at 23–24, 89–90, 139.
89
These states are Delaware, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. Id.
90
Other state codes provide different definitions of minor for different sections. Maryland’s code does not
define the term minor in § 11-207 (child pornography) but § 11-208 (possession of visual representation of
child under 16 engaged in certain sexual acts) defines minor as anyone under sixteen. MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW §§ 11-207, 11-208 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). It is unclear whether this definition is intended to
apply to the section preceding it. Missouri defines a child as anyone under fourteen, but child pornography
includes “[a]ny obscene material or performance depicting sexual conduct, sexual contact, or a sexual
performance, as these terms are defined in [§] 556.061, and which has as one of its participants or portrays
as an observer of such conduct, contact, or performance a minor under the age of eighteen.” MO. ANN.
STAT. § 573.010(2)(a) (West 2011). In Nevada, minor is not explicitly defined either, but the punishments
vary based on the age of the child involved in the pornography. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.750
(LexisNexis 2006) (“A person punishable pursuant to NRS 200.710 or 200.720 shall be punished for a
category A felony by imprisonment in the state prison: 1. If the minor is 14 years of age or older, for life
with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 5 years has been
served . . . and shall be further punished by a fine of not more than $100,000. 2. If the minor is less than
14 years of age, for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum
of 10 years has been served, and shall be further punished by a fine of not more than $100,000.”). New
Jersey’s statutes are similarly ambiguous, with some sections defining a minor as anyone under eighteen
and other sections defining a minor as anyone under sixteen. In New York, some provisions apply to
minors under sixteen, others apply to minors under seventeen.
91
For example, in Texas, sexual conduct with a minor under eighteen is a second degree felony. If the
minor is under fourteen, the felony becomes a first degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25(c) (West
2011). Virginia also defines a minor as anyone under the age of eighteen, but also enhances penalties
where the minor is less than fifteen. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(C1)–(C2) (2009).
92
For example, Texas allows an affirmative defense if the defendant is not more than two years older than
the minor involved. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25(f)(3).
93
Virginia, for example, enhances penalties where the adult is more than seven years older than the minor
involved. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(C1)–(C2).

67

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2012

of the minor involved.94 State laws also vary in terms of their reach, with some, like
Pennsylvania, extending broadly to “nudity . . . depicted for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction,”95 while other
states provide for narrower definitions of prohibited expression.96
¶26
As applied to instances of sexting, the vast majority of state laws—like comparable
federal laws—provide no exceptions for sexually explicit images that are voluntarily
created and shared by teens, despite the fact that under these state laws, some teens are
old enough to legally consent to engage in sexual activity. As under the federal law, this
means that an individual can legally consent to engage in sexual activity, yet face severe
criminal punishment for creating, possessing, or sharing an image of herself engaged in
such activity. Once again, this presents serious First Amendment problems.
¶27
To make matters worse, some states have recently specifically amended their child
pornography and related laws to expressly cover instances of sexting. Lawmakers in
eleven states introduced legislation in 2009 aimed at deterring teens from sexting.97
Colorado, for example, added “text messages” to the definition of the means to commit
“computer dissemination of indecent material to a child”98 so as to encompass sexting
within the reach of this law. Following this trend, Utah recently enacted legislation
providing for penalties for minors who distribute pornographic material or who deal in
material harmful to a minor.99 In summary, sexting appears to be within the reach of
most state child pornography laws, and some states are expressly revising their laws to
make clear that they encompass acts of sexting.
C. Child Pornography Jurisprudence
¶28

First Amendment law regarding child pornography has evolved along a somewhat
separate course than the law governing obscenity generally. While both areas involve
sexually themed works, the Supreme Court has articulated a separate jurisprudence

94

See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.320(2)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2008) (“Promoting a sexual
performance by a minor is: (a) A Class C felony if the minor involved in the sexual performance is less
than eighteen (18) years old at the time the minor engages in the prohibited activity; (b) A Class B felony if
the minor involved in the sexual performance is less than sixteen (16) years old at the time the minor
engages in the prohibited activity.”).
95
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009).
96
See supra text accompanying notes 90–94.
97
See 2009 “Sexting” Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17756 (last updated Sept. 1, 2010).
98
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-1002(1) (2011) (defining “computer dissemination of indecent material to
a child” as “[a] person commits computer dissemination of indecent material to a child when: (a) Knowing
the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated
nudity, or sexual conduct, as defined in section 19-1-103(97), C.R.S., the person willfully uses a computer,
computer network, telephone network, data network, or computer system allowing the input, output,
examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another or a textmessaging or instant-messaging system to initiate or engage in such communication with a person he or she
believes to be a child; and (b) By means of such communication the person importunes, invites, entices, or
induces a person he or she believes to be a child to engage in sexual contact, sexual intrusion, or sexual
penetration with the person, or to engage in a sexual performance or sexual conduct, as defined in section
19-1-103(97), C.R.S., for the person’s benefit.”).
99
See H.R 14, 2009 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009).
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governing the regulation of sexually themed works with minors as subjects, which
constitutes a “related and overlapping category of proscribable speech.”100
¶29
The law of obscenity governs sexually themed works involving subjects of all
ages—adults and minors. Indeed, although incidents of sexting have been the subject of
child pornography prosecutions, such images might also constitute obscene works under
federal or state law. For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court struggled to
articulate a coherent and workable set of guidelines for distinguishing sexually themed
expression protected by the First Amendment from sexually themed expression that
constitutes obscenity. Ultimately, in Miller v. California, the Supreme Court fashioned a
set of guidelines for the regulation of sexually themed works.101 The three-prong Miller
test requires a consideration of
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.102

¶30

The Miller test provides important safeguards for sexually themed speech. Miller
first makes clear that obscenity is determined using a local, community standard.103
Specifically, the applicable standard is that of the average member of the community,
applying contemporary community standards to assess whether the expression at issue,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.104 Second, Miller requires that, to
regulate obscene content, a regulator (whether the federal, state, or local government)
must specifically define which descriptions or depictions of specific sexual acts may be
deemed patently offensive under contemporary community standards.105
This
requirement reduces the potential for vagueness within obscenity statutes.106
Determining whether a work is patently offensive, like determining whether a work
appeals to the prurient interest, is judged under the standard of the average member of the
local community.107 The third prong of Miller provides that judges retain the power to
determine whether sexually themed speech has redeeming serious social value (i.e.,
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value) and, therefore, whether such speech is
protected by the First Amendment regardless of its assessment by local communities.108
Because this determination is ultimately to be made by courts and not jury members, this
100

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008).
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). These guidelines remain the current standard. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 157 (1974); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).
102
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957)).
103
Id. at 30–32.
104
Id. at 30–31.
105
See id. at 24–25.
106
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997).
107
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 576 n.7 (2002) (“[T]he ‘patently offensive’ prong of the test is
also a question of fact to be decided by a jury applying contemporary community standards.”).
108
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing jury verdict where film in question was not
patently offensive under the Miller standard).
101

69

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2012

“savings clause” provides a judicial check on local communities’ power to determine
what sexually themed expression is unprotected by the First Amendment. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “the serious value requirement ‘allows appellate courts to
impose some limitations and regularity on the definition [of obscenity] by setting, as a
matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value.’”109
¶31
A decade after it set forth the Miller standard governing obscene works generally,
the Supreme Court articulated a separate test for sexually themed works depicting
minors, which are afforded less First Amendment protection. For works involving child
pornography, New York v. Ferber fashioned a separate test that did not include the
speech-protective elements of the Miller test.110 Since its Ferber decision in 1982, the
Court has continued to advance this separate but related jurisprudence for sexually
themed works involving minors in cases such as Osborne v. Ohio,111 Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition,112 and recently in United States v. Williams.113
¶32
In Ferber, the Supreme Court made clear that First Amendment protection for
sexually themed works depicting minors is not governed by the same test as obscene
works generally.114 Ferber involved the constitutionality of a New York statute that
criminalized the promotion of a “sexual performance by a child.”115 The statute defined
child as anyone fifteen years of age or younger116 and included a detailed and specific
definition of sexual performance.117 Paul Ferber was the proprietor of a Manhattan
bookstore specializing in sexually themed works and sold two films to an undercover
police officer that depicted young boys masturbating.118 Ferber challenged the
constitutionality of the New York statute, claiming that the works in question were
governed by the Miller obscenity standard and that the state had no power to criminalize

109

See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 579 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 873). Thus, even if a less “tolerant”
community made the determination that a certain edition of The Joy of Sex was obscene and unprotected by
the First Amendment, Miller requires that such determinations be second-guessed by the judicial branch,
which has the responsibility for applying this Miller savings clause to declare that the expression at issue
nonetheless has serious redeeming social value and is therefore protected by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, despite the fact that a local jury in Georgia, applying its state obscenity statute, determined
that the Academy Award-winning film Carnal Knowledge appealed to the prurient interest and described
sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, the Court in that case enjoyed and exercised the power to
determine that the work nonetheless enjoyed serious literary value. The Court was therefore able to rescue
the film from the jury’s classification of it as obscene and unprotected by the First Amendment. See
Jenkins, 418 U.S. 153.
110
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
111
495 U.S. 103 (1990).
112
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
113
553 U.S. 285 (2008).
114
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
115
Id. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116
Id. (noting that the statute defined “sexual performance” as “any performance or part thereof which
includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age”) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
117
Id. (noting that the statute defined “sexual conduct” to include “actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of
the genitals”) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118
Id. at 751–52.
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depictions of sexual conduct involving minors that were not legally obscene under
Miller.119 The Supreme Court disagreed.
¶33
First, the Court rejected Ferber’s argument that sexual works involving children
can only be banned if the works are obscene under the Miller standard.120 Because the
“prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government
objective of surpassing importance,” the state’s interest in preventing these harms is
distinct from the state’s interest in preventing offense from viewing obscene material that
the Court credited in Miller.121 The Court observed that the Miller standard, which
recognizes the state’s interest in protecting the “sensibilities of unwilling recipients” from
offense brought about by exposure to pornographic materials,122 “does not reflect the
State’s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the
sexual exploitation of children.”123 While Miller primarily concerns offenses based on
unwilling exposure to sexually themed expression generally, the state’s interest in
regulating child pornography primarily centers around drying up the market for child
pornography and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse of children by punishing those
who commercially promote material that involves the sexual exploitation of children—
which is itself a crime. To remove the economic incentive for commercial exploitation of
such works and to protect children from sexual exploitation, the Supreme Court
recognized that states must be permitted to regulate materials that involve actual sexual
exploitation of children under a standard different than that articulated in Miller.
¶34
Under the standard articulated in Ferber, states may prohibit the promotion of
sexual conduct involving a minor to dry up the market for the sexual exploitation and
abuse of children if (1) such conduct is specifically and narrowly defined by the
applicable state law, and (2) the work visually depicts sexual conduct by children at or
below a specified age (which, in the case of the New York statute, was fifteen years of
age).124 The Court was careful to emphasize, however, that depictions of nudity, without
more, could not be constitutionally prohibited.125
¶35
Yet, because the state’s interest in drying up the material for the sexual exploitation
of children is stronger than its interest in protecting adults from being offended by
unwilling exposure to obscene works, the safeguards applicable to sexually themed works
depicting adults generally do not extend to sexually themed works depicting minors.
First, to be proscribable under Ferber, the work need not be “taken as a whole,” nor must
the work “appeal[] to the prurient interest of the average person” or be “patently
offensive.”126 Furthermore, under Ferber’s test, it is apparently irrelevant whether the
material has “serious literary, artistic, political or . . . social value”127 when determining
119

Id. at 760–61.
Id.
121
Id. at 757.
122
Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123
Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
124
Id. at 764.
125
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112, 113–14 (1990) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18, for the
proposition that “depictions of nudity, without more, constitute protected [First Amendment] expression”
and holding that the Ohio Supreme Court’s limiting construction of the state statute at issue in that case
“avoided penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous photographs of naked children”).
126
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
127
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
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whether a work is illegal child pornography. The Court has further distinguished child
pornography from obscenity in its decisions regarding private possession. While adults
enjoy the right to possess even obscene works in the privacy of their own homes under
Stanley v. Georgia,128 the Court made clear in Osborne v. Ohio that private possession of
child pornography is not similarly protected.129 Because the state has a compelling
interest in “stamp[ing] out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain” and because
such images, even if privately possessed, “permanently record the victim’s abuse,” the
private possession of child pornography is not constitutionally protected.130
¶36
The Supreme Court further articulated its child pornography jurisprudence in
evaluating the constitutionality of the federal Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996.131 This Act extended the federal prohibition against child pornography to sexually
explicit images that appear to depict minors, but that were produced without actual
minors, and to material that was promoted so as to convey the impression that it involved
minors, even if it actually did not.132 Extending the definition of child pornography to
sexually explicit depictions that appear to be of a minor, the CPPA intended to capture a
range of depictions involving virtual child pornography that include computer-generated
images of minors, as well as images of actual youthful-looking adults engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. Second, the CPPA extended the definition of child
pornography to computer-modified images of real children that are made to appear as if
the children are engaged in sexual activity, even though no minors were actually engaged
in sexual activity.133 Third, the CPPA extended the definition of child pornography to
include any sexually explicit image that is “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” that it depicts a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.134 This provision was intended to encompass
sexually explicit images that are intentionally “pandered” as child pornography,135
regardless of whether any actual children were depicted in such images. Minor is defined
as anyone under the age of eighteen,136 an age that is above the legal age for marriage in
virtually every state and above the age at which persons may consent to sexual relations
in most states.137 The CPPA also provided for severe penalties for violations of these
128

394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the “mere private possession of obscene material” is not a
crime).
129
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (holding that “Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing
of child pornography”).
130
Id. at 110–11.
131
See Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-26.
132
Id. § 121(2)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-28 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006))
133
See id. (extending the definition of child pornography to include material that has been “created,
adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct”).
134
Id. (codified at § 2256(8)(D) (Supp. II 1997) (repealed by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21,
§ 503(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003))).
135
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002).
136
18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (2006).
137
See id. § 2243(a) (age of consent in the federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction is sixteen); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 1021–22 (1997) (listing the age
of consent for engaging in sexual activity in each state, which shows the age is sixteen or younger in thirtynine states and the District of Columbia); NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 384–88 (Richard A. Leiter
ed., 3d ed. 1999) (stating forty-eight states permit sixteen-year-olds to marry with parental consent).
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provisions, including prison terms of up to fifteen years for first-time offenders and up to
thirty years for repeat offenders.138 The Free Speech Coalition, a trade association for the
adult entertainment industry and artists specializing in nude and erotic images, challenged
several of the definitional changes enacted by the CPPA.139 The challengers asserted that
because the statute banned images that do not involve actual children engaging in sexual
performances, it swept too broadly and infringed their First Amendment rights.140 The
Supreme Court agreed.
¶37
The Court in Free Speech Coalition reviewed and clarified its holding in Ferber by
explaining that Ferber stood for the proposition that the distribution, sale, and production
of child pornography could be banned because such acts “were ‘intrinsically related’ to
the sexual abuse of children in two ways.”141 Because the commercial trafficking in child
pornography was an economic motive for its production, “[t]he most expeditious . . .
method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing
severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the
product.”142 Further, the Ferber Court held that because pornographic material depicting
actual children constituted a permanent record of the child’s abuse, the continued
circulation of the material would harm the child who participated.143 The Court
explained that, under either of these rationales, the images had a “proximate link to the
crime from which it came”144 and went on to hold that “the creation of the speech is itself
the crime of child abuse.”145 In contrast, the Court stated that the first provision of the
CPPA challenged by Free Speech Coalition, which prohibited the creation of sexually
explicit images using youthful-looking adults or computer-generated images of
(imaginary) minors, restricted “speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its
production.”146 The Court therefore emphasized that the state’s interest in regulating
child pornography is primarily one of drying up the market for depictions of child sexual
abuse involving actual children—activity that involves an actual crime.147
¶38
The Court next examined the provision of the statute prohibiting sexually explicit
materials that “conve[y] the impression” of depicting minors if the material was
promoted or “pandered” in such a way as to suggest that it involved actual minors,148
even if it did not. Under this provision, it is irrelevant whether the sexually explicit
138

CPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(3)–(5), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-28 to 3009-30 (1996) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251(d), 2252(b), 2252A(b) (Supp. II 1997)). The current statute provides similarly harsh
penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2006) (providing up to thirty years for first-time offenders and up to life
for repeat offenders); id. §§ 2252(b), 2252A(b) (providing up to twenty years for first-time offenders and
up to forty years for repeat offenders).
139
Because the second extension, involving morphed images, applied to images of actual children, whose
interests were implicated by the morphing of their images to make it appear that they were engaged in
sexual acts, this extension was not challenged by the plaintiffs in this case.
140
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 243.
141
Id. at 249.
142
Id. at 249–50 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
143
Id. at 249.
144
Id. at 250.
145
Id. at 254.
146
Id. at 250.
147
Id. at 254.
148
Id. at 257 (alteration in original).
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images actually depict any minors. Even if a work contains no sexually explicit scenes
involving minors, it could still constitute child pornography that could be banned if the
promotion of the work conveys the impression that it involves actual minors.149 In
evaluating this provision, the Court acknowledged that its prior precedent recognized that
the “pandering” or commercial exploitation of a work factors in the issue of whether the
work constituted illegal obscenity.150 In Ginzburg v. United States, for example, the
Court explained that “in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with respect
to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the [obscenity] test.”151
However, the Court in Free Speech Coalition emphasized that the challenged prong of
the CPPA impermissibly went beyond Ginzburg’s pandering rationale to criminalize
works even absent a context of “commercial exploitation.”152 The majority reasoned that
this provision of the CPPA went far beyond prohibiting commercial exploitation because
it classified materials falling within this provision as “tainted and unlawful in the hands
of all who receive it” simply because the materials were “described, or pandered, as child
pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain.”153 Possession of such material
would constitute a crime, even if the material contained no sexual performance by a
minor, so long as someone earlier in the distribution chain had promoted the material as
containing such a sexual performance. This provision had the effect of criminally
prohibiting the mere possession of sexual explicit materials, regardless of whether they
contain sexual performances by a minor. As a result, the Court had little difficulty
finding this provision unconstitutional.
¶39
Taken together, Ferber and Free Speech Coalition make clear that the state has a
compelling interest in preventing the sexual abuse of children and that this interest may
constitutionally be advanced by targeting those who engage in the commercial
exploitation of images involving actual sexual abuse of children or that otherwise have a
“proximate link” to the crime of sexual exploitation or abuse of children.154 The Court
emphasized the interest of prosecuting those who commercially promote or participate in
the sexual exploitation and abuse of children, as well as drying up the market for such
exploitation and abuse.155 Importantly, the Court also clarified that where the content in
question is not a product of sexual abuse or proximately linked to the sexual abuse and
exploitation of children (nor legally obscene under Miller), such content enjoys full First
Amendment protection.156
¶40
After the Court struck down provisions of the CPPA, Congress went back to the
drawing board and attempted to remedy the constitutional defects identified by the
Court—in particular, in the CPPA’s pandering provision. The result was the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act

149

Id.
Id. at 257–58.
151
383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).
152
535 U.S. at 258.
153
Id.
154
See id. at 250.
155
See id. at 254.
156
See id. at 251 (New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764–65 (1982), made clear that “where the speech is
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
150
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of 2003, which set forth a revised “pandering and solicitation” provision.157 In United
States v. Williams, Michael Williams challenged his conviction for pandering under this
provision of the Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.158 The Court rejected his challenge
and upheld the provision.
¶41
The Court first acknowledged that this section, which prohibits offers to provide
and requests to obtain child pornography, does not require the actual existence of child
pornography.159 Rather, it “bans the collateral speech that introduces such material into
the child-pornography distribution network,”160 which is typically (but not exclusively) a
commercial market. Although this section does not require the actual existence of child
pornography, the Court nonetheless held that speech falling within the scope of § 2252A
could be banned on the ground that “[o]ffers to engage in illegal transactions,” like the
exchange of child pornography, “are categorically excluded from First Amendment
protection.”161 Because an offer to provide or a request to receive child pornography is in
fact an offer to engage in an illegal transaction, this collateral speech could be banned so
long as the speaker believes, or intends the listener to believe, that the subject of the
proposed transaction involves real children.162
¶42
Several important lessons for the current controversies surrounding sexting may be
drawn from the Supreme Court’s child pornography jurisprudence. First, the Court has
focused primarily on the harm that arises from transactions in content integral to the
crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse of children. Second, the Court has focused on
the commercial or transactional nature of the conduct at issue. In the child pornography
context, the Court has recognized the government’s interest in drying up the commercial,
or transactional,163 market for child pornography. This emphasis on the market for child
pornography echoes the Court’s emphasis in the obscenity context, in which the Court
has determined that criminal prohibitions on noncommercial sexually themed speech are

157

See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 503(1)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 680 (2003) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2006)) (revising pandering provision to apply to any person who knowingly
“advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits . . . any material or purported material in a manner
that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material
is, or contains . . . a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct”). The Act
also provides an appropriately detailed and narrow definition of “sexually explicit conduct,” which includes
“actual or simulated—(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oralanal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id. § 502(b),
117 Stat. at 678–79 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)).
158
553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
159
Id. at 293.
160
Id. at 288.
161
Id. at 297.
162
Id. at 293.
163
As the Court explained in Williams,
To be clear, our conclusion that all the words in this list relate to transactions is not to say
that they relate to commercial transactions. One could certainly “distribute” child
pornography without expecting payment in return. Indeed, in much Internet file sharing of
child pornography each participant makes his files available for free to other participants—as
Williams did in this case. . . . To run afoul of the statute, the speech need only accompany or
seek to induce the transfer of child pornography from one person to another.
Id. at 295.
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unconstitutional.164 Third, the Court has explained that depictions of nudity alone—even
those involving minors—cannot form the sole basis of a child pornography prosecution.
Fourth, the Court has been critical of attempts to criminalize the mere depiction of teens
engaged in sexual activity—especially when those depicted are at or near the age at
which they can legally consent to have sex. The Court has also been critical of attempts
to increase the statutory age of “child” for precisely this reason. In criticizing the
CPPA’s extension of the definition of minor to include all those who are or appear to be
seventeen years of age or younger, the Court explained that “[t]he statute proscribes the
visual depiction of an idea—that of teenagers engaging in sexual activity—that is a fact
of modern society and has been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages.”165 The
Court observed that the age established by the CPPA was higher than the legal age at
which persons could legally consent to sexual relations, leading to the anomalous result
in which an individual could consent to sexual relations yet be criminally prosecuted
under the CPPA for depicting such sexual relations.
D. The Constitutionality of Prosecuting Sexting as Child Pornography
¶43

A review of the Supreme Court’s child pornography jurisprudence makes clear that
sexting prosecutions like those described in Part II cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny. First, typical acts of sexting do not depict sexual abuse or exploitation of
children—the gravamen of legitimate child pornography claims. The state’s interest in
prosecuting acts of sexting is not the same as the interest recognized by the Supreme
Court of drying up the market for content that constitutes a “proximate link to the
crime”166 of sexual exploitation or abuse of children. Second, acts of sexting typically
occur in a noncommercial context, not in commercial or transactional contexts. Third,
many incidents of sexting—like the Pennsylvania and Florida cases discussed above—
involve mere depictions of nudity or partial nudity, which the Court has held are
insufficient to constitute child pornography. Fourth, several instances of sexting, like in
Phillip Alpert,167 A.H., and J.G.W.,168 involve minors at or near the age of consent, which
the Court has made clear are particularly problematic.
¶44
In addition, the Supreme Court has determined that minors enjoy First Amendment
rights to access and disseminate sexually themed expression of the kind typically
involved in sexting communications. Although minors’ First Amendment rights are not
as extensive as those enjoyed by adults, they are extensive enough to protect the creation
and dissemination of semi-nude and nude pictures of oneself that are not child
pornography or obscene-for-minors (under properly limited definitions of both terms).
Indeed, the act of creating a photograph of oneself, like creating a self-portrait or writing
in a diary, is an essential component of an individual’s self-expression, the furtherance of
which is an essential function of the First Amendment. Part IV contends that

164

See the discussion of Reno v. ACLU and the comparison between the Communications Decency Act’s
provisions and the statute at issue in the Ginsberg case infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
165
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).
166
Id. at 250.
167
See supra text accompanying notes 37–50.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 27–36.
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prosecutions of minors for creating and sharing such images violate the First Amendment
rights of the minors involved.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF MINORS
¶45

Although minors’ First Amendment rights are not as extensive as those enjoyed by
adults, the Supreme Court has made it clear that minors enjoy meaningful rights to
freedom of expression in general. As the Court explained in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville,
minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and
only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar
public dissemination of protected materials to them.
. . . In most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no
less applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to
minors.169

The Court has also held that minors enjoy meaningful rights to access sexually themed
content. This Part first examines the philosophical underpinnings of free speech rights in
general and then considers these foundations as applied to minors in particular. It
outlines the general contours of minors’ First Amendment rights and examines these
rights in relation to sexually themed content.
¶46
In considering the contours of minors’ free speech rights, it is helpful to return to
the philosophical underpinnings and justifications for free speech rights in general and to
consider how these translate in the context of minors’ interests in free expression.
Among the most important justifications for protecting freedom of expression is the
integral role this protection plays in self-exploration, self-expression, and self-definition.
Although the Court frequently refers to the importance of free speech in establishing the
preconditions for democratic self-governance and in advancing the free and open
marketplace of ideas,170 it has also made clear that “[t]he individual’s interest in selfexpression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and
informed discussion.”171 As David Richards explains, the First Amendment rests not
only on the value of creating an informed electorate, but also rests “on deeper moral
premises regarding the general exercise of autonomous expressive and judgmental
capacity and the good that this affords in human life.”172 Similarly, in the words of preeminent First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson, individual self-fulfillment depends
upon the development of an individual’s capacity for reasoning and emotions, selfexploration, self-expression, and self-definition to form “an integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self.”173 This
169

422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1187 (1970).
171
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978).
172
David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 68 (1974).
173
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
170
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justification presupposes that adults engage in the active process of self-definition and redefinition, which First Amendment freedoms facilitate. Yet minors, if anything, are even
more deeply entrenched in the process of self-exploration and self-definition. Consistent
with this justification for First Amendment freedoms, it is important to protect minors’
right to express themselves and to access the expression of others, so as to facilitate their
process of self-exploration, self-expression, and self-definition.
¶47
The Supreme Court expounded upon the self-expression justification for First
Amendment freedoms in Procunier v. Martinez, in which the Court struck down
restrictions on the ability of prisoners to communicate with the outside world.174
Although prisoners (like minors) enjoy free speech rights that are not as robust as those
enjoyed by free adults, the Court emphasized the important role the First Amendment
serves in advancing individual self-expression:
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression. Such
expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity.
To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and
affront the individual’s worth and dignity. Such restraint may be “the greatest
displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.”
. . . It is the role of the First Amendment and this Court to protect those precious
personal rights by which we satisfy such basic yearnings of the human spirit.175

Indeed, in expounding on the importance of self-expression to First Amendment
freedoms, the Court expressly incorporated the right to access sexually themed
expression in the privacy of one’s home, which the Court held is protected in Stanley v.
Georgia.176 Accordingly, the Court has contemplated that the First Amendment’s
protections for self-exploration and self-expression incorporate the right to access
sexually themed expression.
¶48
The Court has also emphasized other important values the First Amendment serves,
including access to a wide range of ideas and information that apply not only to adults but
to minors as well. As the Court held in the famous Pico case, in which it restricted a
school board’s discretion to remove books from school libraries:
Our precedents have focused not only on the role of the First Amendment in
fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas. . . .
....

174

416 U.S. 396 (1974). These regulations “proscribed inmate correspondence that ‘unduly complain[ed],’
‘magnif[ied] grievances,’ ‘express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs,’ or
contained matter deemed ‘defamatory’ or ‘otherwise inappropriate.’” Id. at 396 (alterations in original).
175
Id. at 427–28 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
176
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to
view obscene publications in the privacy of his own home).
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. . . [S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding.177

¶49

Similarly, in striking down a public school’s decision to suspend minors for
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, the Court explained that “[i]n the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression.”178 In sum, the First Amendment
justification of facilitating individuals’ self-expression, self-exploration, and selfdefinition is of pre-eminent importance, especially as applied to minors, who are
entrenched in this self-evolutionary process.
¶50
First Amendment protections also facilitate the goals of democratic selfgovernment.179 Although this justification applies directly only to individuals who have
reached the age of majority and are formally capable of voting and engaging in the task
of self-government, it applies indirectly to minors as well. During youth, individuals are
and should be engaged in the process of acquiring the tools they need to engage in selfgovernment when they do reach the age of majority. Older minors especially must be
accorded broad access to a wide variety of content to develop these tools. Striking down
efforts to restrict minors’ access to violent video game content, Judge Richard Posner
explains in American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick:
Now that eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is obvious that they must be
allowed the freedom to form their political views on the basis of uncensored
speech before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when they
first exercise the franchise. . . . People are unlikely to become well-functioning,
independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an
intellectual bubble.180

¶51

Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the state’s effort to compel students to
pledge allegiance to the flag in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
explaining that “educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.”181 Protecting minors’ freedom of expression is necessary to allow them to
experience and experiment with the freedoms necessary to exercise meaningful rights of
self-government. The closer an individual is to the age of majority, the more extensive
are her free speech rights. Adolescence marks a transitional period in which individuals
should enjoy and experience many of the freedoms that they will come to enjoy fully in
adulthood so that they will be better able to meaningfully enjoy those freedoms when
they come of age. Our system of free expression should ensure that adolescents are able
to inform themselves and contribute to the public discourse even though they cannot yet
177

Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–68 (1982) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–12 (1969).
179
See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948).
180
244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
181
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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participate in public elections. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents of the University of New York, “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of ideas” and information.182
¶52
The Supreme Court has also made clear that older minors enjoy a First Amendment
right to engage in and access sexually themed expression, so long as such expression is
not obscene, “obscene-for-minors,” or child pornography. Although minors’ First
Amendment rights regarding sexually explicit materials are more limited than adults’
rights, they are nonetheless substantial.
¶53
Reno v. ACLU is instructive in articulating the contours of minors’ First
Amendment rights regarding sexually themed expression.183 The Supreme Court struck
down the Communications Decency Act’s (CDA) criminal prohibitions on the
transmission of indecent messages to minors184 and on the display of patently offensive
messages to minors.185 The fact that both of these prohibitions were limited by
affirmative defenses made available for those who undertook good faith actions to restrict
minors’ access to the prohibited communications did not save the provisions.186 In
evaluating the constitutionality of these prohibitions, the Supreme Court first compared
them to the restrictions at issue in Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court first
recognized a category of obscene-for-minors speech that could be regulated under a
different standard than obscene speech (for adults).187
182

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
See 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
184
See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d)–(h) (2006)). The first provision prohibited the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. II 1997)
(“Whoever—(1) in interstate or foreign communications . . . (B) by means of a telecommunications device
knowingly—(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; . . . (2) knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with
the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.”).
185
The second provision prohibited the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a
manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (“Whoever—(1) in interstate
or foreign communications knowingly—(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific
person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user
of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2) knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under such person’s control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.”).
186
See id. § 223(e)(5) (extending affirmative defenses to those who take “good faith, reasonable, effective,
and appropriate actions” to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications and to those who
restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified
credit card or an adult identification number or code).
187
See 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (The state “can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and
morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for
adults.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183
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¶54

The Reno Court explained that because the CDA’s restrictions did not embody
similar safeguards to those in the New York statute, it unconstitutionally infringed on
minors’ (and adults’) free speech rights.188 In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld a
New York statute that regulated minors’ access to content that fell within the statute’s
definition of obscene for minors.189 The state statute primarily aimed to restrict the sale
of “girlie” magazines to minors. It prohibited the sale of materials considered obscene
for minors (although not necessarily obscene for adults) to individuals age sixteen and
under.190 In accordance with the Supreme Court cases that require regulation of obscene
speech to include a savings clause,191 the New York statute exempted from regulation
material that has redeeming social importance to minors. Upholding the statute against a
constitutional challenge, the Court emphasized that the statute’s operation did not usurp
parental autonomy to determine what material was suitable for their children in that the
statute allowed “parents who so desire [to] purchas[e] the magazines for their
children.”192
¶55
Ginsberg therefore stands for the principle that minors’ speech can be regulated
under a different standard than that applicable to adults’ speech, so long as the relevant
regulation adheres to certain safeguards. These safeguards include the definitional
safeguards set forth in Miller193 tailored to apply to minors, including a savings clause for
speech that has redeeming social importance for minors and a patently offensive and
prurient interest analysis undertaken in light of contemporary community standards.
Requiring a savings clause in this context makes clear that any such regulation must
preserve minors’ access to expression that has serious literary, artistic, scientific, or
political value.194
¶56
In Reno, the Court compared the indecent transmission and patently offensive
display provisions of the CDA to those provisions at issue in Ginsberg and found that the
CDA’s provisions were constitutionally infirm.195 First, the Court held that the CDA was
infirm because it defined minor as everyone under eighteen, where the New York statute
defined minor as everyone under seventeen.196 Because the CDA reduced the First
Amendment rights of those nearest to the age of majority, it did not meet constitutional
muster.197 The Court’s analysis on this point suggests that seventeen-year-old minors’
First Amendment rights must be construed as extensively as adults’ First Amendment
rights, including their right to engage in and access sexually themed expression. Second,
while the New York statute was appropriately tailored in line with Miller by limiting its
definition of “material that is harmful to minors” with the requirement that it be “without
redeeming social importance for minors,” the CDA failed to provide any definition of the
188

Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631–33.
190
Id. at 645–47.
191
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (“The portrayal of sex, e.g. in art, literature and
scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press.”) (footnote omitted).
192
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
193
See supra text accompanying notes 101–109.
194
See supra text accompanying notes 108–109.
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Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–67 (1997).
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Id. at 865–66.
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term “indecent.” The CDA also omitted any requirement that the “patently offensive”
material covered by § 223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.198
The Court explained that “[t]his ‘societal value’ requirement, absent in the CDA, allows
appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as
a matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value.”199 Third, while in
Ginsberg the statute’s prohibition against sales to minors did not bar parents from
purchasing the magazines for their children, under the CDA, “neither the parents’
consent—nor even their participation—in the communication would avoid the
application of the statute.”200 Refusing to account for parental discretion on this score
disregards the Supreme Court’s “consistent recognition of the principle that ‘the parents’
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in
the structure of our society.’”201 Finally, the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg
applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA contained no such
limitation.202
¶57
An analysis of Ginsberg and Reno, together with the Supreme Court’s child
pornography jurisprudence, indicates that minors enjoy a First Amendment right to
communicate and access content that is not proximately linked to actual child abuse or
exploitation. This right to communicate encompasses the noncommercial communication
of sexually themed material that has societal value for minors and is not obscene for
minors. And any attempt by the state to regulate minors’ communication of sexually
themed content must take care to preserve parents’ authority in their own households to
determine which sexually themed content their children will have the right to access and
exchange.
V. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS TO EXEMPT SEXTING
¶58

State and federal child pornography laws do not sufficiently protect minors’ free
speech rights. Such laws cannot constitutionally be applied to minors engaged in
incidents of sexting. These laws should be revised to specifically exempt sexting
engaged in by consenting teens, as described in Part I. Non-obscene depictions of nudity
or sexual activity created by teens and exchanged voluntarily for noncommercial
purposes should be specifically excluded from the definition of child pornography or
related crimes. Child pornography and related laws should be amended to exempt
sexually themed images that are voluntarily and consensually produced and made
available by teens in a noncommercial context.
¶59
In 2009, the Vermont Senate took precisely such an approach which should serve
as a model to other states and the federal government. The Vermont Senate attempted to
amend its Sex Trafficking of Children statute to specifically exclude application to
persons eighteen and younger, where the minor photographed is “at least 13 years old,
and the child knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion use[s] an
electronic communication device to transmit an image of himself or herself to another
198

Id. at 865.
Id. at 873.
200
Id. at 865.
201
Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
202
Id.
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person.”203 Such legislation would allow prosecutors to send teenage sexting cases to
juvenile courts to eliminate the stigma that accompanies child pornography convictions.
Such legislation would also prevent prosecutors from labeling juveniles convicted of
sexting as sex offenders. Under Vermont’s proposed law, even minors convicted of this
behavior more than once would not be eligible for sex offender status (although under the
legislation they may be prosecuted in a district court rather than family or juvenile court).
¶60
Several other states have taken the approach of providing an educational, rather
than a criminal law, solution to the problem of sexting. In the wake of a 2009 incident in
which prosecutors charged a fourteen-year-old girl with distributing child pornography
for posting nude images of herself on her MySpace account, New Jersey legislators
proposed alternatives to criminal prosecutions for those engaging in sexting.204 Such
proposed legislation creates a diversionary program where minors charged with creating
or disseminating sexually explicit images can avoid prosecution by completing an
educational program focusing on the legal and non-legal consequences (including the
effect on relationships and the loss of future job opportunities) of such acts.205 Under the
proposed legislation, prosecutors have the discretion to divert any minor charged with
distribution of nude or sexually explicit images into the program.
¶61
States should follow the lead of the Vermont Senate and New Jersey and revise
their child pornography and related laws to expressly exempt typical incidents of sexting,
consistent with the protections the First Amendment extends to minors communicating
non-obscene sexually themed expression that does not constitute a proximate link to
sexual abuse or exploitation of children. Congress should follow this lead as well and
revise federal child pornography laws to recognize and protect minors’ rights to engage
in sexually themed communications of the kind described above.
¶62
If legislators are unwilling to assume the important but politically unpopular task of
revising their child pornography laws to account for the First Amendment rights of
minors, then courts construing such laws should recognize and protect these rights. The
first appellate court to construe state child pornography laws as applied to sexting did just
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See Act of June 1, 2009, No. 58, § 2, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 552, 553–54 (“No person shall
knowingly: (1) recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, or obtain by any means a person under the age of
18 for the purpose of having the person engage in a commercial sex act; (2) compel a person through force,
fraud, or coercion to engage in a commercial sex act; or (3) benefit financially or by receiving anything of
value from participation in a venture, knowing that force, fraud, or coercion was or will be used to compel
any person to engage in a commercial sex act as part of the venture.”) (repealed 2011); An Act Relating to
Expanding the Sex Offender Registry, S. 125 § 3, 2009 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/Senate/S-125.pdf (“This section shall not apply if the person is
less than 19 years old, the child is at least 13 years old, and the child knowingly and voluntarily and
without threat or coercion used an electronic communication device to transmit an image of himself or
herself to the person. . . .”) (passed in the Senate but not enacted); id. § 4 (“This section shall not apply if
the person is less than 19 years old, the child is at least 13 years old, and the child knowingly and
voluntarily and without threat or coercion used an electronic communication device to transmit an image of
himself or herself to the person.”) (passed in the Senate but not enacted); id. § 5 (“This section shall not
apply if the person is less than 19 years old, the child is at least 13 years old, and the child knowingly and
voluntarily and without threat or coercion, used an electronic communication device to transmit an image
of himself or herself to the person.”) (passed in the Senate but not enacted).
204
See Act of Sept. 16, 2011, ch. 128 (N.J.) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. §§ C.2A:4A-71(2), C.2A:4A71.1(2)); see also Toutant, supra note 51.
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Act of Sept. 16, 2011, ch. 128 (N.J.).
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that in Miller v. Mitchell.206 In that case,207 the district attorney threatened to prosecute
several teenagers under child pornography laws unless they attended an extensive
education program designed by the district attorney.208 The parents of three of the
implicated girls sued the district attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that this
action constituted retaliation against their daughters in violation of the girls’ First
Amendment rights to appear in the photographs, the girls’ right to be free from being
compelled to attend the re-education program, and the parents’ substantive due process
rights to direct their children’s upbringing.209
¶63
The district court ruled in favor of the parents, finding, inter alia, that because the
pictures were not illegal under Pennsylvania’s child pornography law, the only reason to
prosecute them would be in retaliation for exercising their constitutional right not to
participate in the district attorney’s education program.210 In enjoining the district
attorney from initiating criminal charges against the girls in connection with the
photographs or their refusal to attend the education program, the district court found that
under Pennsylvania law, “plaintiffs make a reasonable argument that the images
presented to the court do not appear to qualify in any way as depictions of prohibited
sexual acts.”211 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the education program required
by the district attorney impermissibly violated the daughters’ First Amendment right not
to engage in compelled speech and the parents’ right to raise their children without undue
state interference.212
¶64
In summary, legislatures should revise their child pornography laws to exempt acts
of sexting from their reach and ensure that such laws are not used to harm the very people
they were designed to protect. Alternatively, courts should construe state child
pornography laws consistent with Supreme Court precedent to protect the First
Amendment rights of the minors involved and the due process rights of their parents to
direct the upbringing of their children free of undue state interference.
VI. PRIVACY NOT PORNOGRAPHY
A. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
¶65

In some examples discussed in Part II, nude or sexually themed images of minors,
initially created with the subject’s permission, were then disseminated or otherwise made
available beyond the scope of the subject’s consent. This Article contends that, although
such incidents do not support criminal child pornography charges, they may nonetheless
constitute harmful and actionable invasions of privacy.
¶66
Under most states’ privacy laws, the transmission of a nude or sexually explicit
picture without the subject’s consent constitutes an invasion of privacy as a publication of
a private “fact.”213 As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
206

598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’g Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
See supra text accompanying notes 9–26.
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Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 143–44.
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Id. at 147–48.
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Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634.
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Id. at 645.
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Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 155.
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One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.214

¶67

Although there is a First Amendment defense for the publication of information or
images revealing private facts that are “newsworthy” or are otherwise a legitimate matter
of public concern, in the overwhelming majority of sexting cases—where one teenager
forwards a nude picture of the subject to other friends or classmates, for example—this
“newsworthiness” exception would not apply. Furthermore, under the public disclosure
of private facts branch of the invasion of privacy tort, truth does not serve as an
affirmative defense.215 The publication of the private facts tort encompasses, for
example, making available information about the fact that an individual has a sexually
transmitted disease or revealing information about a person’s sexual orientation, if such
information has not previously been revealed to the public, is not legitimately
newsworthy, and if publication of this information would be offensive to a reasonable
person. The public disclosure of private fact tort would encompass acts of sexting in
which an image is shared without or beyond the subject’s consent.
¶68
Courts in many jurisdictions have held that the dissemination of nude, semi-nude,
or similarly revealing pictures of an individual without or beyond that individual’s
consent are actionable invasions of privacy as publications of private facts.216 In G.J.D.
v. Johnson, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed an award of
compensatory and punitive damages to a woman whose former partner distributed nude
pictures of her throughout the community.217 Similarly, in a case where a plaintiff
voluntarily created nude photographs of herself on film and brought the film to
214

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 175 (2011) (“Truth, while a defense to an action of libel, is not a
defense to an action for an invasion of the right of privacy.”) (footnotes omitted).
216
See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (police taking and circulating nude photographs of
plaintiff, which were allegedly taken to obtain evidence of bruises from assault, may give rise to an
invasion of privacy claim); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (defendant
newspaper liable for publishing photograph of plaintiff’s skirt blowing up over her waist at county fair fun
house); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984 (Idaho 1974) (television station that aired footage of
plaintiff being arrested and emerging naked from his house could be held liable for invasion of privacy);
Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078
(9th Cir. 2002); Myers v. U.S. Camera Publ’g Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (nudity is a
private fact giving rise to damages when shown beyond persons to whom consent is given); Gallon v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (publication of nude photograph without
authorization is an invasion of privacy). For academic commentary, see generally Peter B. Edelman, Free
Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1209 n.74 (1990) (noting
cases that allowed recovery when defendants published nude or revealing photographs, odd and disfiguring
medical conditions, and details from the plaintiff’s past life); Patrick J. McNulty, The Public Disclosure of
Private Facts: There Is Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2001); John A. Jurata, Jr.,
Comment, The Tort that Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private
Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 510–30 (1999).
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669 A.2d 378 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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defendant’s photofinishing shop to be developed, the defendant was found liable for
invasion of privacy when an employee developed and circulated those photographs to a
group of individuals without the plaintiff’s consent.218 Further, in a case where the
plaintiff consented to be photographed nude for the limited purpose of publication in a
book, the court held the defendant liable for invasion of privacy because he exceeded the
scope of the consent by publishing one of the photographs in a newspaper.219 Some
courts have held that posting on the Internet video footage of individuals engaging in
sexual activity constitutes a violation of the individuals’ right to privacy (even where the
subject is a public figure, such as Pamela Lee Anderson, who previously consented to
making other nude photos available to the public).220
¶69
Although posting a nude or sexually explicit image of an individual on the Internet
would readily satisfy the “public” aspect of the public disclosure of private facts tort, it is
less clear whether forwarding such an image to a handful of other acquaintances would
satisfy this element. The case law suggests that, while revealing such images to one
person does not suffice for public disclosure, sharing images with (at least) a handful of
others—as occurs in the typical sexting context—would satisfy the publicity requirement.
For example, in Lemnah v. American Breeders Service, Inc., the court held that where
only one person had received the communication (that the plaintiff was fired for
drunkenness), there was not the kind of publicity necessary to sustain a public disclosure
of private fact claim.221 However, in several cases that involved dissemination of private
information to (at least) a handful of other people, courts have considered such
dissemination to be public enough to constitute a valid claim for public disclosure of a
private fact. For example, in Bolduc v. Bailey, the defendant accused the plaintiff, a
priest, of several criminal and moral offenses.222 The defendant communicated these
accusations in a series of conversations with fellow members of the plaintiff’s religious
society.223 Even though the defendant did not communicate the accusations to the public
at large—only to a limited group—the court found that the complaint properly pled an
invasion of privacy for public disclosure of private facts.224
¶70
Accordingly, individuals who possess sexting images with the subject’s initial
assent and further disseminate sexting images beyond the subject’s initial consent are
liable for invading the privacy of the subject, and are properly subject to damages and
injunctive relief. For example, in the case described above in which Phillip Alpert emailed nude pictures of his former girlfriend to seventy of her e-mail contacts, Phillip
would be liable in an invasion of privacy action brought by his former girlfriend for
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See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (reversing trial court dismissal of
complaint against Wal-Mart and its photo department employees who allegedly distributed nude photos of
plaintiffs, and holding that the case could proceed under the privacy theory of public disclosure of private
facts, among others).
219
McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (defendant newspaper liable when
plaintiff consented to being photographed nude in the bathtub for publication in a book but not in a
newspaper).
220
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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482 A.2d 700, 704 (Vt. 1984).
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586 F. Supp. 896, 899 (D. Colo. 1984).
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public disclosure of private facts for sharing this image with a large number of other
individuals.225
B. Intermediary Liability for Public Disclosure of Private Facts
¶71

Individuals who disseminate nude, semi-nude or otherwise sexually explicit images
of minors to others without or beyond the subject’s consent should be held accountable
under the publication of private fact branch of the invasion of privacy tort. However, the
subject’s ability to sue the disseminator for damages or injunctive relief may provide
incomplete relief, especially in circumstances in which the image is made available by a
website run by another party such as MySpace or Facebook. Given the current state of
the law, it is exceedingly difficult for an individual to hold a website liable in tort for any
type of harm resulting from the website’s publication of an image. While these social
networking sites generally undertake measures to remove such images (once made aware
of them), 47 U.S.C. § 230, enacted by the CDA, immunizes such sites from liability for
their role in making such images available.226 Below, this Article argues that § 230(c)
should be revised or reinterpreted by courts to reach a more privacy-protective outcome.
¶72
In passing the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Congress sought to remedy
perceived ills caused by certain types of offensive expression on the Internet using two
different approaches. First, the CDA prohibited the transmission of certain types of
sexually themed expression on the Internet.227 These provisions prohibiting the
transmission of “indecent” content and prohibiting the display of “patently offensive”228
content were insufficiently attentive to the First Amendment rights of individuals, and, as
discussed above,229 were quickly struck down by the Supreme Court.230 Second,
Congress also sought to respond to earlier decisions that held websites liable for
defamatory content posted by subscribers. Earlier cases treated websites as publishers of
information made available by the website’s subscribers and held the websites
secondarily liable for defamation and related torts. In one early case in particular,
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., a website had reserved and exercised
editorial control over the content made available by its subscribers.231 The court in
Stratton Oakmont held that such control rendered the website a publisher of the
defamatory content made available by its subscriber.232 In response to pleas by website
owners to immunize them from liability in such circumstances, Congress passed § 230(c),
which both encourages websites to continue to engage in acts of good faith exercises of
editorial control—such as by blocking objectionable material233—and immunizes them
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See supra text accompanying notes 37–50.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)).
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Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133–34 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223).
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See supra text accompanying note 198.
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See supra text accompanying notes 195–202.
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See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
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Id. at *4.
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47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006) (“No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material
that the provider . . . considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected . . . .”).
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from liability for publishing or distributing harmful material made available by their
subscribers. This provision stipulates that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”234
¶73
The CDA achieves its purpose to the extent these provisions immunize interactive
computer services and websites from liability, like Prodigy, that cannot be expected to
control ex ante every post made by every subscriber.235 Since this provision became law,
however, countless websites have successfully claimed immunity from a broad range of
lawsuits for making available content posted by others—both as an initial matter and
after the harmful nature of such content has been asserted by the plaintiff. Indeed, courts
have extended § 230(c)’s immunity well beyond defamation, to other state causes of
action, such as negligence and gross negligence,236 nuisance,237 sending threatening
messages,238 and even statutory violations of the Fair Housing Act and related antidiscrimination violations.239 Section 230 expressly provides that its immunity does not
extend to federal criminal law, including liability for obscenity or for sexual exploitation
234

Id. § 230(c)(1). Although the statutory language here refers to “interactive computer service,” which is
defined as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server,” courts have held that web sites in general are encompassed
by this definition. See id. § 230(f)(2).
235
For example, in an early case involving § 230 immunity, the Fourth Circuit extended broad immunity
from liability to AOL for the defamatory post of an AOL subscriber. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), the court held that AOL was not liable for negligent distribution of defamatory
material after an AOL user carried out a malicious hoax on the victim Zeran—even where AOL refused to
take down the defamatory material upon learning of it. The plaintiff argued that § 230 leaves intact liability
for interactive computer service providers who possess notice of defamatory material posted through their
services. The court rejected plaintiff’s attempts to impose notice-based liability on Internet service
providers (ISPs), explaining that:
By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a
computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.
Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
236
See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding MySpace’s immunity from
negligence and gross negligence liability for failing to institute safety measures to protect minors and for
failure to institute policies relating to age verification, in a case in which the Doe’s daughter had lied about
her age and communicated over MySpace with a man who later sexually assaulted her).
237
See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the
city’s immunity from claims of nuisance, inter alia, where plaintiff’s child downloaded pornography from
a public library’s computers which did not restrict Internet access to minors).
238
See, e.g., Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding immunity
from state tort claims arising from an employee’s use of the employer’s e-mail system to send threatening
messages).
239
See Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th
Cir. 2008) (upholding § 230(c) immunity for online services provider Craigslist against Fair Housing Act
claims based on discriminatory statements in postings on the classifieds website by third party users). But
see Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (rejecting immunity for the Roommates.com roommate matching service for claims brought
under the federal Fair Housing Act and California housing discrimination laws because the website created
the questions used for discriminatory practices).
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of children,240 nor does it extend to liability for intellectual property violations.241
Additionally, the statute explicitly provides that it does not prevent states from enforcing
any state law that is consistent with this section.242 However, in construing § 230 in the
context of defenses asserted by Internet service providers and websites, courts have
extended this statutory provision unnecessarily broadly and have provided website
defendants with immunity for hosting sexually explicit content that is inconsistent with
the limited purpose of the statute.
¶74
Consider, for example, Barnes v. Yahoo, in which the Ninth Circuit extended broad
immunity to Yahoo.243 In 2004, Cecilia Barnes’s ex-boyfriend created unauthorized
Yahoo profiles of Cecilia and posted nude pictures of Cecilia on those profiles.244 The
profile pages provided Cecilia’s work phone number and e-mail address and led viewers
to believe that Cecilia was seeking to engage in casual sexual relations.245 Not
surprisingly, strangers began contacting Cecilia at work by phone and e-mail, as well as
showing up at her workplace.246 Cecilia contacted Yahoo several times over the next few
months to request that the profile be removed, to no avail.247 A local television reporter
learned of Cecilia’s situation and began to prepare a news story on the subject.248 When
the reporter contacted Yahoo on Cecilia’s behalf, Yahoo’s communications director
promised that she would make sure the profiles were removed.249 When Yahoo still had
not acted on its express promise to remove the profiles almost two months later, Cecilia
brought suit against the company.250
¶75
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Barnes’ tort claim against Yahoo for
negligent undertaking was barred by § 230(c).251 However, Barnes was also able to
assert a contractual claim of promissory estoppel against Yahoo for failing to make good
on its express promise to remove the images.252 Only because Yahoo expressly promised
to Barnes that it would promptly remove the offending material, but failed to do so, could
Barnes proceed in her action against Yahoo.253 The Ninth Circuit made clear that absent
an express promise on the part of the website hosting such offending content that it would
remove such content, a plaintiff’s claim will be barred by § 230(c).254
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See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement
of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation
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The immunity § 230 grants websites for harms arising from their subscribers’
speech has been extended too far. Websites like Yahoo and Facebook, presented with
notice and clear evidence that the subject of a nude or sexually explicit image did not
consent to posting the image (as in the Barnes v. Yahoo case), should be required to
promptly remove that image or face liability for violating that individual’s privacy.255 A
similar regime in the copyright infringement context provides a helpful model. Under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a copyright owner who believes his or her material
has been infringed may provide notice to a website stating his or her belief that the
website is hosting infringing content.256 Upon receipt of such notice, the website must
immediately cease hosting such allegedly infringing content to secure the benefits of the
statute’s limitations on liability.257 Unlike § 230, which courts have construed to provide
broad immunity to websites regardless of whether they remove the offensive content
identified by the subject, the corresponding copyright provisions require the website to
act in good faith upon notice to remove the offending content to secure the limitation of
liability. Although an obligation to remove such allegedly offensive content, if imposed
too broadly, may lead to a chilling of free speech and fair use rights,258 in the limited
context of nude or sexually explicit images that the subject can conclusively establish
have been posted without her consent, there is no similar danger that websites’ free
speech rights will be unduly chilled. In construing § 230, courts should hold that a
website that fails to remove such images upon notice and receipt of proper documentation
from the subject has participated in the invasion of privacy and is indirectly liable for
such conduct. Interpreting the statutory language that “[n]o [service] provider . . . shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider,”259 courts should conclude that when a website refuses to take down the
images in a timely manner upon proper request, such material is no longer material that is
made available by another information content provider, but becomes material made
available by the website itself, for which it is liable.
VII.

¶77

[2012

CONCLUSION

As teenagers explore their sexuality and seek to memorialize and exchange
information related to their sexual development, their instantaneous ability to
255

Like many U.S. states, the European Union (EU) does not hold ISPs liable so long as they only act as a
conduit for information and do not participate in the content selection process. In contrast to the system in
the U.S., however, ISPs in the EU are required to remove illegal content upon notification of such. See
Directive 2000/31, on Electronic Commerce, arts. 12–15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). If the content is not
removed, they can be held liable, as Google was in a recent Italian case involving a video of an autistic boy.
Manuela D’Alessandro, Google Executives Convicted for Italy Autism Video, REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61N2G520100224. Here, the defendant successfully
claimed that Google should have been on notice when the video became a headline news story, and not
waited until police notified them of the illegal content. Furthermore, the EU permits ISPs to voluntarily
monitor their sites for illegal content.
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257
Id.
258
See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices
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L.J. 621(2006).
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memorialize and share images with others, via cell phones or the Internet, presents a host
of new problems to which society must respond intelligently. The recent trend of harshly
punishing these teens under the child pornography regime is not an intelligent solution.
In light of this wave of prosecutorial overreaching, state and federal child pornography
laws should be revised to specifically exempt sexting by minors from the reach of such
laws. Child pornography laws were created to punish and deter a far different class of
conduct—the conduct of adult pedophiles creating and disseminating images that depict
sexual abuse of their child victims in a commercial context—not the conduct of older
minors using technology to explore their sexuality and voluntarily exchange images with
one another. Non-obscene depictions of nudity or sexual conduct created by teens and
exchanged voluntarily among themselves for noncommercial purposes should be
specifically excluded from the applicable definitions of child pornography and similar
crimes.
¶78
Instances of sexting, however, should not necessarily go unpunished, as they may
constitute harmful invasions of the subject’s privacy. In cases in which nude or sexually
themed images of minors, which were initially created with the subject’s consent, are
disseminated or otherwise made available without or beyond the scope of the subject’s
consent, such conduct should be cognizable as actionable invasions of the subject’s
privacy under the publication of private facts branch of this common law tort. The
subject should be able to seek relief not only against the individual who made such
images available without her consent, but also against a website that continues to host
such images after being notified of their presence. Websites that continue to facilitate the
hosting of such images after the subject requests their removal should lose their immunity
for hosting such content and should be held liable for facilitating the invasion of the
subject’s privacy.
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